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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARGIE M. JEPPSON, sometimes 
known as MARGIE M. JEPPSON 
EDGEL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EMELIA LARSON JEPPSON, 
Defendant and Appellant, Case No. 81353 
and THORA JEPPSON SPILKER, 
ERVIN F. JEPPSON, ALTA JEPPSON 
JENSEN, OVID A. JEPPSON, RUTH 
JEPPSON SJOSTRON and NORDA 
JEPPSON, 
Intervening Defendants, 
Brief of Appellant 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action brought by the respondent to quiet 
the title of the respondent as against the appellant to the 
following described real property situated in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
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Commencing 80 rods North and 27.5 rods East from 
the Southwest corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, 
Range I East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running 
thence South 46° 27' East I55 feet; thence North 43° 
33' East I20 feet, more or less, to a point 40 rods due 
East of West line of said Section 29; thence South 307 
feet, more or less, to a point 60 rods North of the South 
line of said Section 29; thence West 4 79 feet to Easterly 
line of State Road; thence Northeasterly along said 
State Road to place of beginning. 
Also, commencing 80 rods North and 27.5 rods East 
and North 43° 33' East I60 feet from the Southwest 
corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range l 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 46° 27' East I55 feet; thence South 43° 
33' West to a point 80 rods due North of the South 
line of said Section 29; thence .East 39 rods, ·more 
or less to the center of the Southwest quarter of said 
Section 29; thence North IO chains; thence West, to 
Easterly line of State Road; thence South 43° 33' 
West 7 50 feet, more or less, to the place of beginning. 
(Tr. I) 
The property in question was part of the tract of land 
which was owned by Ephraim Jeppson, deceased, the hus· 
band of the appellant and the father of the respondent. The 
estate of the said Ephraim Jeppson, deceased, was enter· 
ed for probate on February 6, I934 in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, as Probate File No. I836l. The appellant, 
Emelia Larson Jeppson, who was the widow of Ephraim 
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Jeppson, deceased, and the mother of the respondent was 
appointed administratrix of said estate. (Tr. 33) 
The administratrix had caused the real property of the 
estate to be appraised by the duly appointed appraisers 
of the Court and the appraisement was in the sum of 
$2400.00. 
The real property of the estate had been mortgaged by 
the administratrix under the authorization and direction of 
the Court to the Home Owners' Loan Corporation under date 
of March 9, 1934 in the sum of $1973.62. (Tr. 33) 
The respondent claims that she was a creditor of the 
estate in the amount of approximately $320.94. 
During the month of April, 1936, the appellant as 
administratrix of said estate petitioned the Court for con-
firmation of the sale of the real property of the estate to the 
respondent and under date of April 17, 1936, an order 
confirming the sale to the respondent Margie Jeppson for the 
sum of $2205.45,. the highest bidder, was entered by the 
Court. This consideration was discharged by the respondent's 
claim above mentioned in the sum of $320.94 and by her 
assumption of the mortgage in favor of Home Owners' 
Loan Corporation in the remaining balance of $1884.51. 
(Tr. 33) 
An administratrix's deed issued under date of April 
18, 1936, from Emelia L. Jeppson, administratrix of the 
estate of Ephraim Jeppson, deceased, in favor of Margie 
Jeppson, and said administratrix's deed was recorded April 
27, 1936, in Book 165 of Deeds, pages 249-50, records of 
the Office of the County Recorder ·of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. The said appellant did not sign the deed in 
her individual capacity and has never made conveyance or 
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delivery of a deed conveying her statutory dower interest. 
(Tr. 34} 
The real property claimed by the respondent is fenced, 
unimproved pasture land, excepting one corner of said tract 
which is occupied by a canning company for canning 
purposes. 
The appellant caused the other defendants to intervene 
and in the answer and counter-claim in intervention the said 
appellant claims a fee simple interest in an. undivided one-
third interest. (Tr. 12} 
Twelve days after the execution of the administratrix's 
deed, to-wit: April 30, 1936, the State Road Commission of 
Utah purchased a right-of-way for a highway through the 
property and paid the respondent $1892.50, from which 
sum the remaining balance of the Home Owners' Loan Cor· 
poration Mortgage was paid and the property was released 
from the lien of said mortgage. (Tr. 33) Subsequently on 
February 15, 1937, the respondent at the request of the 
appellant executed and delivered to Ervin Fenton Jeppson, 
one of the intervening defendants and the son of the appel-
lant, a warranty deed to a certain portion of the premises 
which had been conveyed to her by administratrix's deed, 
consisting of approximately 5 acres of unimproved property; 
the consideration for the conveyance being that the said 
Ervin Fenton Jeppson would remodel the old home to make 
it liveable for the appellant. (Tr. 82) 
On the 27th day of July, 1939, after the said Ervin 
Fenton Jeppson had improved·the old home, the respondent 
deeded to the appellant a portion of said premises described 
in said administratrix's deed consisting of 56/100 acres 
upon which the old home was located. No consideration 
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passed from the appellant to the respondent for this convey-
ance and the appellant now lives on the premises so conveyed 
to her by respondent. (Tr. 83, 86) 
On another occasion the respondent gave a deed to the 
appellant for another portion of said premises known as the 
Snedeger Tract, and when the said tract was improved with 
a two-room house it was sold to Snedeger. The $700.00 re-
ceived for the conveyance was paid to the appellant, Emelia 
Larson Jeppson. (Tr. 82, 109) 
The balance of the premises has been pastured by Ervin 
F. Jeppson, one of the intervening defendants. All general 
taxes with the exception of the year 194 7 were paid by the 
said Ervin F. Jeppson. ( Tr. 34, 89) 
In the defendant's answer in intervention it is stated that 
the claim of the respondent of $325.94 satisfied by the 
execution and delivery of said administratrix's deed, repre-
sented an accumulation of monies advanced by all other heirs 
of said estate as well as the respondent. 
II 
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS 
Comes now the above-named appellant and says that 
there is manifest error in the records, proceedings and 
judgment entered in this cause in this, to-wit: 
l. The Court erred in making and entering its findings 
of fact numbered 1 as follows, to wit: "That the plaintiff is 
the sole, legal and equitable owner of the following described 
tract of land situated in the County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, and particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
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Commencing 80 rods North and 27.5 rods East from 
the Southwest corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and run-
ning thence South 46° 27' East 155 feet; thence North 
43 o 33' East 120 feet, more or less, to a point 40 rods 
due East of West line of said Section 29; thence South 
307 feet, more or less, to a point 60 rods North of the 
South line of said Section 29; thence West 479 feet, 
to Easterly line of State Road; thence Northeasterly, 
along said State Road, to place of beginning. 
Also, commencing 80 rods North and 27.5 rods 
East and North 43° 33' East 160 feetfrom the Southwest 
corner of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence 
South 46° 27' East 155 feet; thence South 43° 33' 
West, to a point 80 rods due North of the South line 
of said Section 29; thence East 39 rods, more or less, 
to the center of the Southwest quarter of said Section 
29; thence North 10 chains; thence West, to the East-
line of State Road; thence South 43 o 33' West 750 
feet, more or less, to the place of beginning. 
for the reason that there was not sufficient competent evidence 
to support or warrant said finding. (Page 38 of Transcript) 
2. The court erred in making and entering its finding 
of fact numbered 3 as follows: "That in the purchase afore-
said the said plaintiff purchased the said property for her 
own use and benefit, and not as trustee for the defendant 
and the said intervening defendants or any one of them and 
that the plaintiff paid the consideration therefore in the 
manner directed by this court," in that there was no compe· 
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tent evidence to the effect that she said plaintiff paid the 
consideration therefor. (Page 38 of Transcript) 
3. The court erred in making and entering its finding 
of fact numbered 5 as follows: "That the claims of the 
said defendent and each and all of the said intervening 
defendants in and to the said described property are 
without right whatever, and that said defendant and 
all of the said intervening defendants have no right, 
title, estate, equity or interest of, in or to the said real 
property or any part thereof", for the reason that there was 
not sufficient competent evidence to support or warrant 
said finding that the said defendant, Emelia Larson Jeppson, 
has conveyed her interest in said premises. (Page 38 of 
Transcript) 
4. The court erred in making and entering its finding 
of fact to that portion of No. 6 as follows: "Said defendant 
is now barred and estopped from asserting any interest 
of, in, or to the premises retained by the plaintiff and 
heretofore particularly described", for the reason that there 
was not sufficient competent evidence to support or warrant 
said finding. (Page 38 of Transcript) 
5. The court erred in overruling the motion of appellant 
for a new trial as shown on page 44 of the transcript. 
6. The court erred in rendering judgment in favor of 
the respondent against the appellant as shown on pages 35 
and 36 of the transcript. 
7. The court erred in its denial of the judgment in 
favor of the appellant and against the respondent. 
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POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT 
(a) THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS THE SOLE, 
LEGAL AND EQUITABLE OWNER OF THE TRACT OF 
LAND DESCRIBED IN SAID COMPLAINT. 
The court erred in making finding of fact No. 1 herein-
above set out in specification of errors paragraph l. 
Appellant contends that because she did not join in the 
administratrix's deed in her individual capacity her statutory 
interest in an undivided one-third interest in the premises 
described in the said administratrix's deed has not been 
conveyed and that the said appellant is now the owner of 
an undivided one-third interest in said premises. 
Our statutes expressly abolish the common law estates 
of dower and curtesy. (Section 101-4-9, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943). In lieu thereof, Section 101-4-3, U. C. A. 
1943, provides. 
"One third in value of all the legal or equitable estates 
in real property possessed by the husband at any time 
during the marriage, to which the wife has made no 
relinquishment of her rights, shall be set apart as her 
property in fee simple, if she survives him ... Property 
distributed under the provisions of this section shall be 
free from all debts of the decedent except those secur-
ed by liens for work or labor done or material furnished 
exclusively for the improvement of the same, and except 
those created for the purchase thereof, and for taxes 
levied thereon .... " 
Our Supreme Court had occasion to construe the above 
section in the case of In re BULLEN'S ESTATE, 47 Utah 
96, 151 Pac. 533, wherein the court said: 
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"What the wife receives under Section 2826 [which is 
identical with Section 101-4-3, U. C. A. 1943]-one 
third in fee simple of all the legal and equitable estates 
in real property possessed by the husband during 
coverture and not relinquished by her - she receives, 
not as an heir of her husband, but in her own right, 
something which belongs to her absolutely and of which 
she could not have been deprived by will or by any 
other voluntary act of her husband without her consent. 
Under that section, she is not an heir within the meaning 
of our intestate or succession statutes." 
A number of authorities are reviewed in the opmwn, 
and among others, the court quotes the following from 
"In re ESTATE OF STRAHAN, 93 Neb. 828: 
"It has been held by the great weight of authority that 
dower is not immune because it is dower, but because it, 
like the right to the homestead and to the distributive 
share of the widow of the estate of her deceased hus-
band, belonged to her inchoately during his life and 
·vested fully in her at his death. Under the present 
statute the wife takes her interest in the estate of her 
deceased husband by operation of law. It is something 
which belongs to her absolutely and independently of 
any right of inheritance of succession. The share of 
the realty which under our law goes to the widow in-
dependent of any will or act of the husband is not, so to 
speak, a part of his estate and is no more liable to a 
succession tax at his death than is her individual prop-
erty derived from her own ancestors and held in her 
own name, though the husband may have had the 
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management and control of the estate during his life-
time." 
Thus a widow holds her statutory interest, absolutely and 
in fee simple, in h~r own right and completely independent 
of the estate of her husband. Her interest is not a part of 
the husband's estate and is not subject to the husband's debts 
except such as are enumerated in the statute, i. e. those 
incurred directly for the benefit of the property involved. 
The interest, not being a part of the husband's estate, does 
not pass to a purchaser under a probate sale of the property 
belonging to the husband's estate, unless the widow joins in 
the conveyance in her own right or is otherwise estopped 
from claiming her interest. If it be argued that the con-
struction placed upon the statute in the case of In re Bul-
len's Estate was influenced by the fact that it was a case 
involving the inheritance tax statute wherein the tendency 
is to construe the statute in favor of the taxpayer, the case 
of STAATS v. STAATS, 63 Utah 470, 226 Pac. 677, broad-
ens the interpretation to other than tax cases. That case 
involved a contest between a widow and son respecting the 
husband's realty, the son claiming that he was entitled to 
some as surviving partner of his father and to other of the 
property as tenant in common. The court said: 
"Counsel have cited some authorities to the effect that a 
widow of a deceased husband takes her dower interest 
as an heir, and that she is protected under the statute 
aforesaid. [Statute relating to disqualification of inter-
ested witnesses]. This court is, however, committed 
to a contrary doctrine, in that we have held that under 
our statute the widow of a deceased husband does not 
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take as an heir. In re Bullen's Estate, 47 Utah 96. 
It is held that a widow takes here one third interest in 
her husband's real estate not as an heir, but in her 
own right. That case was subsequently approved and 
followed in Re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah I7, I89, Pac. 
409." 
As to the manner in which the widow's interest matures 
from an inchoate interest held during her husband's lifetime 
into an absolute interest the court In Re Reynolds' Estate, 
90 Utah 4IS, 62 Pac. (2nd) 270, has this to say: 
" ... The wife's interest has some of the aspects of joint 
tenancy in one-third of the real estate. In the common 
law joint tenancy, each owned every bit of the whole. 
One who dies simply fell away from the title. The 
husband by predeceasing her does not effectuate a 
passage of title of her one third, but only recedes from 
the interest she had, at the same time maturing it." 
WAS WIDOW'S INTEREST DIVESTED BY THE 
PROBATE SALE? 
The appellant, Em eli a Larson Jeppson, the widow of 
Ephraim Jeppson, the latter being the record owner of 
the premises involved in this action at the time of his demise, 
was at the time of her husband's death the owner in fee 
simple of one third of the said real estate. Was that 
interest divested by virtue of the probate sale of the property 
in the matter of the Estate of Ephraim Jeppson, deceased? 
Speaking of the interest which passes under a probate sale, 
it is said in 2I American Jurisprudence, Executors and 
Administrators 11 568: 
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"All that it (the probate court) ever pretends to do in 
a proceeding of this character is to order the sale of 
whatever interest the decedent may have had in the 
land at the time of his death. It never assumes to 
decide whether he was in fact the owner." 
Since the decedent here had no interest in the widow's 
statutory estate, that interest did not pass merely by virtue of 
the probate sale. The rule as to dower and curtesy rights is 
slated in 24 C. J. 684: 
"As a widow's dower is not usually subject to the general 
debts of the husband, her right to dower, or to a statutory 
estate in the nature thereof, is not usually divested by 
an administration sale, although under some statutes the 
rule is otherwise." (citing decisions from a number 
of states) 
A footnote on the same page of 24 C. J. quotes from SHELL 
v. YOUNG, 78 Ark. 479, 95 S. W. 798: 
"The sale is simply inoperative, so far as the widow's 
dower is concerned, as it is an interest in the land 
superior to the claims of creditors, and the purchaser 
simply took subject to the right of the widow's dower, 
which may be set aside against the purchaser as well 
as the heirs and creditors. Livingston v. Cochran, 33 
Ark. 306; Well v. Smith, 40 Ark. 17" 
In OWEN v. SLATTER, 26 Ala. 547,62 Am. D. 745, the 
sale was made by commissioners appointed by the court 
upon the petition of the widow as administratrix. The court 
said: 
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"The sale of the real estate, made under decree of the 
Probate Court, vests in the purchasers only the title 
which the ancestor had, and which upon his death 
descended upon his heirs-at-law. The widow's right 
to dower is unaffected by the sale, unless, indeed, she 
bars her right by some act which, in a court of equity, 
would constitute it a fraud in her to insist upon it. 
"The fact in the case before us do not make out 
such a bar. True, the widow in that case is administra-
trix; but the law prescribes her duty, and so long 
as she acts within the scope of those duties, it would 
be singular indeed that she should forfeit her rights 
as an individual, merely by reason of her having pro-
perly complied with the requirements of the law in her 
fiduciary character . . . . .. 
"We are of the opinion, therefore, that there was no 
fraud on the part of Mrs. Owen, in failing to announce 
at the sale that the land was sold subject to her dower; 
neither is she estopped from setting up her claim to 
dower by reason of her silence." 
It is submitted that although in our state dower has been 
expressly abolished and many of the cases cited in this brief 
deal with dower in the common law sense, many of the 
same rules apply. Almost all of our states have either 
abolished or modified by statute the rules of the common 
law with respect to dower and curtesy, but the terminology 
and rules of interpretation and construction have been 
retained. See 42 Harvard Law Review 330. It is there 
said that "although common law dower and curtesty have 
been superseded by more extensive statutory provisions in 
the United States, the decisions of the courts in construing 
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dower and curtesy are still used in the interpretation of our 
present statutes. Consequently, the legal rules and principles 
incident to the common law system are usually applied to 
the present statutory system." Moreover, the statutory 
estate conferred in this state in lieu of dower is a larger 
estate than the common law estate of dower, and therefore 
requires at least as strong an act on the part of the widow 
to divest that estate as did the common law estate of dower. 
And by the same token, this interest requires at least as 
much protection by our courts as was the case with common 
law dower. 
"Dower has ever been a favorite of the law, statutes 
granting being liberally construed in the wife's favor, 
and it is uniformly hel~ that no construction of a statute 
should be adopted which tends to deprive the wife of 
her right thereto or of any beneficent provision given 
in lieu thereof." 2 Tiffany on Real property (3rd Ed.) 
p. 451, citing cases. 
SALE BY WIDOW AS ADMINISTRATRIX AS 
BARRING RIGHT 
As is shown above, a probate sale of the husband's realty 
does not of itself divest the widow of her dower interest in 
the land. We shall now consider the question of whether a 
probate sale conducted by the widow as administratrix of her 
husband's estate bars her dower interest. The cases are 
collected in an annotation in 30 A. L. R. 944. The annota· 
tion begins: 
"A deed of real estate by the widow of the owner as his 
administratrix, made under the order of the probate 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
court, does not bar her from claiming dower In the 
real estate so sold. 
Wright v. DeGroff, 14 Mich. 165; 
Foley v. Boulware, 86 Mo. App. 674; 
Sip v. Lawback, 17 N. J. L. 442; 
Shurtz v. Thomas, 8 Pa. 359." 
In the Sip v. Lawback case above referred to, where a 
widow and two other persons were administrators of the 
husband's estate and sold land by an order of the court, 
the court states: 
"Defendant knew of widow's right of dower or might 
have known it, except for his own negligence, -Defen-
dant was a neighbor to Mr. Sip and his wife, he knew 
that Mr. Sip died intestate, he knew he was treating 
with administrators for the purchase of the land and that 
the act of the legislature (which every m"an shall be 
presumed to know) entitled the widow to dower. It 
was an administrators sale, the advertisement, the arti-
cles of vendue and the whole proceedings was notice 
to everyone that the widow was only selling as admin-
istratrix and only selling such title and interest in the 
land as an administratrix could sell." 
It is the opinion of counsel that the case before the Court 
is even stronger than the above cited case as certainly the 
plaintiff, the daughter of the defendant, Emelia Larson 
Jeppson, knew that Mr. Jeppson died intestate and she also 
knew or was presumed to know that her mother had a statu-
tory dower interest in the real property possessed by the 
husband at the time of his death. 
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In Foley vs. Boulware, 86 Mo. App. 674, the widow 
was not estopped from claiming dower in the land, although 
she told the purchaser before the sale that the title was 
good and perfect and gave no intimation that she claimed 
dower, but there was nothing to show that she was acting 
in bad faith. 
In Martien v. Norris, 91 No. 465, the declaration of 
the agent of the executors to the purchaser, "that the title 
was perfect or unquestionable" did not have the effect 
of estopping the widow from claiming dower, although she 
thought at the time that she was not entitled to dower. 
In Wright vs. DeGroff, 14 Mich. 164, the administratrix 
deed contained the following clause: 
"And I do hereby covenant with said- that I will 
warrant and defend said premises against the lawful 
claims and demands of all persons claiming by, from, 
or under me, but against no other person." 
It was held that she was not estopped thereby to claim dower 
in the land. 
Under this annotation the cases which allow an estoppel 
of the claim of dower are where the facts can be construed 
as a surrender of the right of dower. As an example, Gerber 
vs. Upton, 123 Mich. 605, where it appeared that the pur-
chaser agreed with the widow to pay the full value of the 
land, and that she was to surrender her right of dower and 
homestead interest and to give a deed therefor to him and 
that it was announced at the sale that the purchaser would 
obtain a clear title. 
Also, Stephens vs. Craigen Co. 192 N. Y. Supp, 555, in 
the body of the deed it recites: 
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"All the estate therein which the party of the first part 
has or has power to convey or dispose of, whether 
individually or by virtue of said will or otherwise." 
None of these facts apply to the present case. 
(b) THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING THAT THE CLAIM OF SAID 
APPELLANT IS WITHOUT RIGHT WHATEVER, 
AND THAT SAID APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT, 
TITLE, ESTATE, EQUITY OR INTEREST OF, IN, 
OR TO THE SAID REAL PROPERTY OR ANY PART 
THEREOF. 
The court erred in making finding of fact No. 5 here-
inabove set out in specification of errors paragraph 3. 
Same points argued by appellant under subdivision (a) 
above applies to this subdivision. 
(c) THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT IS NOW 
BARRED AND ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
ANY INTEREST OF, IN OR TO THE PREMISES 
RETAINED BY THE RESPONDENT. 
The court erred in making finding of fact No. 6 herein-
above set out in specification of errors paragraph 4. 
Same points argued by appellant under subdivision (a) 
above applies to this subdivision. 
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WHEREFORE appellant prays that the judgement he 
reversed with costs assessed against respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LE GRAND P. BACKMAN, 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
Received copy of the foregoing brief of appellant this 
---day of December, 1948. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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